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HUMAN DIGNITY AND THE LAW
Tibor R. Machan*
In this article, Professor Machan offers the view that a good
legal system is based on a philosophy of individualism or ethical
egoism, and concludes that a legal system best promotes a citi-
zen's human dignity by protecting that citizen's individual
identity and right of free choice. He argues that certain political
and social programs do not in fact benefit the citizen, but rather
are flawed because they erode respect for human dignity.
Ordinarily, members of the legal profession attend only to the
details and technicalities of their craft. It is rare for lawyers to
scrutinize the broader foundations of their profession. In this re-
spect they are similar to most other professionals. Yet, in all
professions, certain basic problems may arise to create difficul-
ties. Even when a profession faces no traumatic crises, it is useful
to keep an eye on fundamental principles in order to prepare for
possible impending difficulties. The concept of human dignity
should be one of the cornerstones of our legal system. This article
will outline a theory of human nature and society based on natu-
ral law in which recognition of human dignity is crucial.
Human dignity is the capacity of individuals to be morally
responsible. Moral responsibility, in turn, arises because human
beings are capable of free choice and rational thought. Rational
consciousness and the ability to make choices make an individual
a moral' agent, since his decisions can be made in accordance
with a rational standard in which some actions are right while
* Associate Professor of Philosophy, State University College, Fredonia, New York;
B.A., Claremont Men's College; M.A., New York University; Ph.D., University of Califor-
nia, Santa Barbara. National Fellow, Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace,
Stanford University (1975-1976). The author wishes to express his thanks to Davis Keeler
of the Law & Liberty Project, Menlo Park, California, for his advice on the legal topics
considered in this article and to his wife Marty Zupan for her invaluable editorial assis-
tance.
1. The concept "moral" refers to the uniquely human task of choosing between right
and wrong conduct in accordance with a standard appropriate to a free and rational agent.
Thus, moral issues require making decisions with reference to such a standard. "Moral"
does not mean ethically good or right. The concept "nature" here means "essential" or
"relating to by definition." So having a moral nature involves essentially being required
to make choices in accordance with a standard.
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others are wrong. Of course, people can adopt improper standards
of judgment-a putative moral position which has no rational
foundation. Still, anyone who can identify or accept and guide
himself by a rational ethic possesses human dignity because of his
ability to execute significant choices in the performance of human
tasks.' It is when he is blocked in this ability that a person's
human dignity has been denied.
The basic institutions of the community should support human
dignity. The law which governs community life should recognize
and uphold the individual's dignity. This can be achieved
through legal policies such as due process and equal protection
under the law.
However, the concept of human dignity has come under serious
attack by some segments of the social sciences, particularly be-
haviorist psychology. Behaviorists have expounded the view that
human action is determined by influences beyond the control of
the individual. Behaviorism denies a person's capacity to choose
his conduct and thus this human dignity-his capacity to be
morally responsible. Professor B. F. Skinner's book Beyond Free-
dom and Dignity' is perhaps the most popularly known work
espousing the behaviorist view.4
2. One need not be a worthy or morally good person to possess human dignity. Merely
the capacity to exercise morally significant choice in the performance of human tasks
requires the acknowledgment of one's dignity.
3. B. F. SKINNER, BEYOND FREEDOM AND DIGNrrY (1971).
4. See generally B. F. SKINNER, THE BEHAVIOR OF ORGANISMS (1938), SCIENCE AND HUMAN
BEHAVIOR (1953), VERBAL BEHAVIOR (1957), CUMULATIVE RECORD (1959), CONTINGENCIES OF
REINFORCEMENT (1969), BEYOND FREEDOM AND DIGNITY (1971), ABOUT BEHAVIORISM (1974).
For detailed criticism of Skinner's ideas see T. MACHAN, THE PSEUDO-SCIENCE OF B. F.
SKINNER (1974); N. Chomsky, Psychology and Ideology, COGNITION (Vol. 1, No. 1), Review
of Skinner's Verbal Behavior, LANGUAGE (Vol. 35, No. 1), The Case Against B. F. Skinner,
NEW YORK REVIEW OF BOOKS (December 30, 1971); R. Efron, The Conditioned Reflex: A
Meaningless Concept, PERSPECTIVES IN BIOLOGY AND MEDICINE 488-513 (1966); A. RAND,
The Stimulus. . . And the Response, THE AYN RAND LETTER (Vol. 1, Nos. 8 & 9).
A very good discussion of the mutual benefit to be gained from work in humanistic and
experimental psychology is offered by I. CHILD, HUMANISTIC PSYCHOLOGY AND THE RE-
SEARCH TRADITION: THEIR SEVERAL VIRTUES (1973). Most emphatic about psychology's
rejection of human freedom of choice is L. Immergluck, Determinism-Freedom in Con-
temporary Psychology, 19 AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGIST 270-81 (1964). Such concepts as
"purpose" and "intention" sometimes trouble determinist psychologists, but more often
than not they simply translate these ideas into forms that accommodate their determin-
ism. See G. MILLER, E. GALANTER & K. PRIBRAM, PLANS AND THE STRUCTURE OF BEHAVIOR
(1960). Outside of psychology proper, we also encounter widespread adherence to the
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Behaviorism is beginning to have a serious impact on our legal
system, surfacing in the positive law5 of legislation, verdicts, and
judicial policy. Encouraged by this view, legal institutions fre-
quently treat people as if they were helpless and lacking free will
and the capacity for purposeful action. This treatment is most
obvious in policies such as involuntary mental hospitalization6
and psychosurgery.7 It is accomplished far less obviously through
preventive laws of various types, such as legislation forcing mo-
torcyclists to wear helmets' and the requirement that drug manu-
facturers prove that their drug is harmless even if no evidence of
behaviorist/determinist/reductionist approach, exhibited, e.g., in the works of R. ARDREY,
THE TERRITORIAL IMPERATIVE (1966); K. LORENZ, EVOLUTION AND THE MODIFICATON OF
BEHAVIOR (1965), ON AGGRESSION (1966). It is difficult to find explicit discussions of the
issue in the prominent literature because most scholars simply presuppose Skinner's view
that science and freedom of choice are inherently in conflict. It is usually philosophers who
discuss the topic explicitly. See DIMENSIONS OF MIND (S. Hook ed. 1960); FREEDOM AND
RESPONSIBILIrY (H. Morris ed. 1961).
A crucial point to keep in mind is that in the social sciences there are two major aims:
explanation and prediction. Explanation is generally taken to involve the showing of what
factors preceded an event and made it occur. Prediction is the stating of what the future
will be, based on knowledge or estimates of present or past events. The very possibility of
free choice is by many people either denied outright or regarded as a mysterious-or
divinely endowed-feature of the universe. The factors considered relevant to explana-
tions and predictions are usually restricted to the observable material aspects of the world.
They therefore exclude choices, decisions, or intentions. Such mental activities have no
place in a view of science that excludes from legitimacy any judgment not strictly reduci-
ble to sensory observations.
Needless to say, this is the extreme version of the position at issue, and many mitigated
versions exist. It is fair to hold, nevertheless, that this version is the ideal being aimed at
and wished for, even though it is sometimes regarded as an impossible ideal. For a clear
discussion of this view, see R. RUDNER, PHILOSOPHY OF SOCIAL SCIENCE (1966). Contra, R.
HARRE & P. SECORD, THE EXPLANATION OF SOCIAL BEHAVIOR (1972); S. TOULMIN, THE USES
OF ARGUMENT (1964).
5. Positive law here refers to what the general public in any modern society regards as
the law: the recorded and enforceable edicts, prohibitions, statutes, regulations, proscrip-
tions, and prescriptions issued by various branches of the government. This can be con-
trasted with proper law, which includes any edict that is within the proper authority of a
government to enact and enforce. Overlaps between these two sets can and arguably
should be considerable.
6. See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 91 1/2, §§8-12 (1975); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 123, §6
(1976); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANNO. §330.1468 (1975).
7. See J. DELGADO, PHYSICAL CONTROL OF THE MIND (1969); Breggin, Is Psychosurgery
on the Upswing?, HUMAN EVENTS (May 5, 1973).
8. See, e.g., ALA. CODE Title 36 §138 (1973); DEL. CODE Title 21 §4185 (1974); FLA. STAT.
ANN. §316.288 (1969).
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harm is present.'
Some argue that such preventive legislation is implemented for
the good of the citizen. Nevertheless, such legislation undermines
continued respect for human dignity. When the basic responsibil-
ity of an individual to make his own decisions is rejected in favor
of governmental paternalism, the legal system stands in opposi-
tion to human nature itself. The impact of a denial of human
dignity may perhaps be resisted by private citizens in such areas
as education, the arts, and personal relationships. Much of what
ensues in these realms enjoys a degree of independence from legal
interference. However, the detrimental impact of the denial of
dignity through positive law is inevitable.
As an example, when poetry is under government control in the
Soviet Union, the essential human dignity of artists is under a
near fatal assault. In our own history, when members of different
racial groups were legally forbidden to marry, the same attack on
human dignity was evident.
In order for the legal system to reaffirm the support of human
dignity instead of state paternalism, the philosophical founda-
tions for proper law must be uncovered. Lawyers are not always
best situated to make this examination. The legal community
must be persuaded as to what values should be protected and
what is wrong with the status quo. It should then develop a con-
sistent legal system based on these values.' 0 This article will out-
line the view that the legal system promotes human dignity most
successfully when it supports individuals' natural human rights."
9. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. §355 (1973); ALASKA STAT. §17.20.110 (1972); CAL. CODE §26288
(1964).
10. Any investigation of this sort requires full reliance on logic. There are, of course,
those who hold that the fundamental propositions of logic are arbitrary. See A. AYER,
LANGUAGE TRUTH AND LOGIC (2d ed. 1946); H. HAHN, LOGIK, MATHEMATIK UND NATURER-
KENNEN (1933); C. LEWIS, MIND AND THE WORLD ORDER (1929); E. NAGEL, LOGIC WITHOUT
METAPHYSICS (1956). Contrary to this view is the proposition that logic acts as an indispen-
sible tool of inquiry because nature is itself governed by basic principles which are ex-
pressed in thought and language through logic. See B. BLANSHARD, REASON AND ANALYSIS
(1962); M. COHEN, A PREFACE To LOGIC (1944); M. SWAREY, LOGIC AND NATURE (1955); T.
Machan, C. S. Peirce and Absolute Truth, PROCEEDINGS OF THE C. S. PEIRCE BICENTENNIAL
INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS (1977); Hollinger, A Defense of Essentialism, 57 THE PERSONALIST
327-44 (1976); Rasmussen, Aristotle and the Defense of the Law of Contradiction, 54 THE
PERSONALIST 149-62 (1973).
11. Opponents will claim that dignity is a myth and merely excuses possessive individu-
alism. See C. B. MACPHERSON, THE POLITICAL THEORY OF POSSESSIVE INDIVIDUALISM: HOBBES
[Vol. 26:807
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The author will argue that while certain political programs super-
ficially appear to benefit the citizen, they in fact are crucially
flawed because they erode respect for human dignity. Addition-
ally, suggestions will be made as to how certain features of a legal
system can best protect an individual's freedom of choice and
why other factors now in force are damaging to it.
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN HUMAN NATURE AND THE LEGAL
SYSTEM
A basic element of the present thesis is Aristotle's observation
that human beings are rational animals capable of choosing their
actions with some end in mind."2 As Ayn Rand, a contemporary
Aristotelian, has stated, we are beings of volitional conscious-
ness."3 Each individual's crucial and distinctive capacity of ra-
tionality consists of having the ability to think and to distinguish
between truth and falsehood and between right and wrong.14 The
very possibility of being wrong and of failing to make the right
judgment indicates that we are able to exercise choices in some
matters. 5 Our freedom of choice cannot be denied without lead-
ing to fundamental paradoxes in human life and thought. The
infinite variety of possible human activities cannot be understood
without accepting the proposition that individuals possess free-
dom of choice." In fact, the denial of free choice is self-refuting:
AND LOCKE (1962). Marxists clearly insist on this. See D. MCLELLAN, MARX (1965). Most
social scientists are firmly convinced that science has shown dignity to be merely a pre-
scientific myth. See note 4 supra.
12. See ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS. See also H. VEATCH, RATIONAL MAN: A MODERN
INTERPRETATION OF ARISTOTELIAN ETHics (1962).
13. See A. RAND, THE VIRTUE OF SELFISHNESS 20-24 (1964).
14. See T. MACHAN, HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMAN LIBERTIES 68 (1975), THE PSEUDO-
SCIENCE OF B. F. SKINNER 152-72 (1974).
15. Contrary to Skinner and many other social scientists, this is emphatically not in
conflict with the requirements of science. See N. BRANDEN, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SELF-
ESTEEM (1968); R. HARRE & P. SECORD, THE EXPLANATION OF SOCIAL BEHAVIOR (1973);
Sperry, Mind, Brain and Humanistic Values, NEw VIEWS OF THE NATURE OF MAN (1965).
16. Only after introducing the fact that human beings are "essentially rational beings
capable of choosing to think" can we make clear sense of various facets of human existence
such as scientific progress, artistic creativity, and all types of novelty.
It has been suggested that this definition of "human being" is arbitrary. "Human
being" could be defined as "an animal with a thumb" or "a biological entity that uses a
comb," but these and similar "definitions" consider only partial distinctiveness and fail
to satisfy comprehensiveness in identifying human nature absolutely. For a discussion and
1977]
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by denying it, we imply that those who do not deny it are wrong
and should deny it, yet it makes no sense to claim that we should
do something if we have no choice in the matter.
17
Aside from the strictly philosophical argument in support of
the existence of human choice, there is scientific evidence that
people can choose. Professor Roger W. Sperry, a psychophysicist,
argues that human action is not merely a conditioned reflex.' 8
Rather, the human brain is a complicated biological organ ena-
bling each person to produce original ideas which can guide him
to act in novel ways. Dr. Sperry argues that subjective aware-
ness 9 and conscious experience can be tied to neural activity and
physical brain processes. Thus, an individual's decision-making
process does not consist of mechanistic, stimulus-response activ-
ity.
If the capacity to choose is essential to human beings, a proper
political and legal system should function so as not to impair that
choice. Laws have emerged throughout history because an or-
full defense of the definition used in this article, see T. MACHAN, HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMAN
LIBERTIES 241-45 (1975). For the underlying theory of definitions, see A. RAND, INTRODUC-
TION TO OBJECTIVIST EPISTEMOLOGY (1970).
17. See J. M. BOYLE, G. GRISEZ & 0. TOLLEFSEN, FREE CHOICE: A SELF-REFERENTIAL
ARGUMENT (1976).
18. See Sperry, Changing Concepts of Consciousness and Free Will, PERSPECTIVES IN
BIOLOGY AND MEDICINE 9-19 (Autumn 1976).
19. In our current interpretation of consciousness, subjective awareness is
conceived to be an emergent property of neural events generated at top levels
in the brain hierarchy. . . . [While] conscious experience [is] a systematic
property of and functionally tied to the physical brain processes. . . [it] must
also be taken into account and included among the controlling causal determi-
nants. This introduces new degrees and qualities of freedom into the brain's
decision-making process, lifting it above mechanistic, physicalistic kind of de-
terminism envisaged in classical behaviorist, stimulus-response, or materialist
doctrine.
Id. at 13.
20. In trying to explain the reason for the emergence and existence of law, numerous
writers have introduced state of nature arguments, postulating conditions of natural an-
archy and determining that by some quasi-causal process organized community life will
emerge. See T. HOBBES, De Cive (The Citizen) in THE ENGLISH WORKS OF THOMAS HOBBES,
vol. II, ch. 12 (1839-45); J. LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT, ch. II, #15
(1689); R. NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA (1974). However, this approach tends to
omit the concept of choice. Another prominent approach speculates about a social
contract where law is the outcome of what people would have done had they united in
seeking their own social survival. See J. RAwLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971). This article
will consider the reasons or purposes, not the causes, for organized human community life
and arrive thereby at the function law should play in such an evidently valuable endeavor.
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derly and well-governed political society" is valuable to human
beings.22 Individuals actualize their full potential through vir-
tually unlimited enhancements that community life offers.
They can develop more successfully" by drawing on the talents
and accomplishments of others. Thus, commerce, education, en-
tertainment, science, sports, and law are all potential contribu-
tors to the enhancement of each person's life. 4 Whatever values
social life enhances, people must still choose to better themselves,
and they often refrain from doing so when in each other's com-
pany.
Aside from private failings, people can fail in ways which injure
others. For example, when someone interjects physical violence
or force into human relationships, there is a great potential of
danger. A primary purpose of the legal system is to prevent all
unjustified violence or coercion in human relationships. By acting
as keeper of the peace, the legal system serves to prevent persons
from interfering with another's independence of judgment. The
law helps protect human liberty within the community and en-
ables the individual to develop to his or her full capacity as a
rational and creative being within his or her own unique situa-
tion.
Laws must be developed to meet the challenges of change and
thereby help to provide a detailed framework for continued free-
dom of action. 5 In order for our legal system to acknowledge this
21. For purposes of this article, political society refers to groups of individuals who need
not be related by blood and who accede to a basic code concerning how members of the
group must never be treated (i.e., forcibly, negligently, unhelpfully, or however they see
it).
22. "Value" for people exists, ultimately, in living their lives in accordance with their
rational, free, purposive and moral nature as effectively and fully as possible, given their
individual circumstances. See A. RAND, THE OBJECTIVIST ETHICS (1961); E. Mack, How To
Derive Ethical Egoism, 52 THE PERSONALIST 736-43 (1971).
23. HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMAN LIBERTIES, supra note 14, at 74-77.
24. This ancient explanation for the existence of law is hardly more than a matter of
common sense. However, determinists such as Skinner and relativists would have to deny
that society and law emerged because of their discovered value.
25. The conception of law developed in this article is normative, and more in the
tradition of natural law than positivist conceptions of legality. See A. P. D'ENTREVES,
NATURAL LAW (1951); P. SIGMUND, NATURAL LAW AND POLITICAL THOUGHT (1971). Although
the overall influence of positivism and realism has outweighed the natural law tradition
in the last century, many writers argue that the U.S. political tradition is related to the
natural law stance. See C. LEBOUTILLIER, AMERICAN DEMOCRACY AND NATURAL LAW (1950);
19771
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goal, the underlying interpersonal moral principles on which law
should be based must be identified." These principles provide a
Baker, Natural Law and the American Revolution, TRADITIONS OF CIVILITY (1948); Manion,
The Natural Law Philosophy of the Founding Fathers, NATURAL LAW AND WORLD LAW
(1954).
The concept of human dignity is individualist rather than collectivist. Within this
framework, the individual human being-not the interests of states, nations, or even
humanity in general-is of primary concern. Contra, G. HEGEL, REASON AND HISTORY
(1837); K. MARX, CRITIQUE OF POLITICAL ECONOMY (1859); B. F. SKINNER, BEYOND FREEDOM
AND DIGNITY (1971). These diverse thinkers concentrate on the well-being interest or eman-
cipation of a group rather than of an individual. Hegel focused on the perfection of the
abstract whole of humanity at some point in the development of history. For Marx,
humanity's material emancipation was the highest historical goal to be reached. He
viewed contemporary individuals as inadequate or immature versions of the final human
community, the communist state. Skinner is concerned with the survival of culture and
regards an individual as "merely a stage in a process which began long before he came
into existence and will long outlast him." Id. at 200.
American culture tends to balance the individualist and collectivist aspects of the
numerous political theories that have emerged. In other parts of the world, only a few
elements of the individualist theory are given prominence. In general, however, nothing
of individualism receives the slightest respect, let alone legal support. For example,
Marx's view is summarized as follows:
The right of man to freedom is not based on the union of man with man, but
on the separation of man from man . . . ; the right of man to property is the
right to enjoy his possessions and dispose of the same arbitrarily, without regard
for other men, independently from society, the right of selfishness.
K. MARX, EARLY TEXTS at 103 (1971).
"Rights" in this context are, according to Locke, grounded on the fact that we all possess
moral autonomy, and proper law enjoins or forbids others' usurpation of this autonomy.
Therefore, Marx is correct in observing that the individualist tradition rejects the political
ideal that individuals must be united coercively by law. However, the individualist view-
point does not deny that we have some moral responsibilities to certain members of a
community, such as family and friends.
The dignity of man is protected by acknowledging, protecting and preserving his rights
through positive law. These rights must be denigrated in order to undermine the individ-
ual's dignity. Accordingly, Skinner can say: "Life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness
are basic rights. But they are the rights of the individual and were listed as such at a time
when the literatures of freedom and dignity were concerned with the aggrandizement of
the individual. They have only a minor bearing on the survival of a culture." B. F.
SKINNER, BEYOND FREEDOM AND DIGNITY at 172 (1971).
26. Different candidates for the correct (rationally warranted) moral position will yield
different conceptions of the proper content and scope of law. When those active in political
affairs have particular ethical views, they usually attempt to shape the law to further the
purposes they believe to be morally proper. Thus, in predominant religious eras the law
tended to serve goals fostered by the dominating religious creeds. See 0. GIERKE, POLITICAL
THEORIES OF THE MIDDLE AGES (1900). In times which emphasized utilitarian goals such
as economic prosperity or the equal distribution of wealth, the laws were directed toward
these goals. See E. BROWNING, REDISTRIBUTION AND THE WELFARE SYSTEM (1975); R. POSNER,
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (1973); Baker, The Ideology of the Economic Analysis of Law,
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social condition in which the individual can benefit from living
in a community while preserving his moral independence and his
freedom to choose between living as a good or an evil person. 7
Because human beings are essentially animals with the capac-
ity to live by the use of reason, they live properly when their
actions are directed by the use of their minds.28 A good legal
system provides an individual with the opportunity to exercise his
choice-making capacity and leaves the responsibility for achiev-
ing success to that person.29 Each individual's moral responsibil-
3 PHILOSOPHY AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS 43 (1975).
Even in criminal law, which in most eras focuses on the protection of people from
malum in se acts, judicial decisions sometimes are governed by considerations of prevail-
ing morality. See T. SZASZ, LAW, LIBERTY, AND PSYCHIATRY 218-21 (1963). Although malum
in se statutes usually survive major ideological changes, so that murder, robbery, and
assault remain crimes in socialist, communist, monarchical, democratic, or fascist coun-
tries, the exact treatment of those found guilty of such crimes changes considerably.
Today, the influence of recent theories in psychology and psychiatry on punishment,
rehabilitation, and guilt has been evident. See H. FINGARETrE, THE MEANING OF CRIMINAL
INSANITY (1972); H. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY (1968); K. MENNINGER, THE
CRIME OF PUNISHMENT (1968); J. MURPHY, PUNISHMENT AND REHABILITATION (1973).
Depending on the values which one considers central, one will advocate legal concepts,
institutions, and systems of adjudication which give instrumental support to defending
these values. See H. ARENDT, THE ORIGINS OF TOTALITARIANISM (1958); B. BAILYN, THE
IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (1967); R. CROSSMAN, THE GOD THAT
FAILED (1950); C. DELSELL, MEDITERRANEAN FASCISM (1969); H. HARRIS, THE SOCIAL PHILOS-
OPHY OF GIOVANNI GENTILE (1960); L. LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT (1968); B.
ZYLSTRA, FROM PLURALISM TO COLLECTIVISM: THE DEVELOPMENT OF LASKI'S POLITICAL
THOUGHT (1968); R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977). All these show the rela-
tionship of the values people hold to the legal systems they support.
27. A morality or an ethical theory aims to identify how human beings can live an
excellent and proper human life. There are numerous proposed ethics or moralities, and
a most difficult task is to identify the best. The correct moral position is one that most
successfully serves as a general system of principles to guide conduct for human beings.
It must be very general in scope to reach all areas of human existence. The idea of human
dignity and the corresponding framework of proper law given support in this article are
based on a detailed ethical theory we may best call individualism or ethical egoism. The
idea is that each person's central task in life is to become an excellent human being within
the context of his or her own individual situation. The fullest realization of one's own
unique human self or ego is the good life for each individual.
28. This conception of moral goodness has its philosophical background in the entire
Aristotelian tradition of ethics. See notes 12, 13 and 22 supra. See also D. NORTON,
PERSONAL DESTINIES: A PHILOSOPHY OF ETHICAL INDIVIDUALISM (1976); T. Machan,
Selfishness and Capitalism, 17 INQUIRY 338 (Fall 1974).
29. For a person to flourish he would have to make the most of what he is-a human
individual with the capacity to make choices. Ayn Rand makes a crucial point about this
ethical framework:
'Happiness' can properly be the purpose of ethics, but not the standard. The
1977]
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ity is to excel as the human being that he is. This ethical system,
namely, individualism or ethical egoism,3" is the basis of a good
legal system.
task of ethics is to define man's proper code of values and thus to give him the
means of achieving happiness. To declare, as the ethical hedonistsdo, that 'the
proper value is whatever gives you pleasure' is to declare that 'the proper value
is whatever you happen to value'-which is an act of intellectual and philosophi-
cal abdication, an act which merely proclaims the futility of ethics and invites
all men to play it deuces wild. [emphasis added].
A. RAND, THE VIRTUE OF SELFISHNESS, 29 (1964). Many professional economists sanction
psychological hedonism in their support of a free society. See, e.g., L. VON MISEs, HUMAN
ACrION (1949). Critics of this conception of human community life have charged its advo-
cates with inviting "all men to play it deuces wild." See D. BELL, THE CULTURAL CONTRADI-
TIONS OF CAPITALISM (1975); I. Kristol, When Virtue Has Lost All Her Loveliness,
CAPITALISM TODAY (1971); Schmitt, The Desire for Private Gain, INQUIRY 149-67 (Summer
1973). But economists are not professional students of ethics. Unfortunately, philosophers
have not combined a clear understanding of ethics with a diligent study of the findings of
economics. Therefore, while economists have defended liberty with little thought of virtue,
philosophers have defended virtue with little regard for liberty. Yet virtue and liberty, as
Skinner keenly perceives, are interdependent: "Goodness, like other aspects of dignity or
worth, waxes as invisible control wanes, and so, of course, does freedom. Hence goodness
and freedom tend to be associated." B. F. SKINNER, BEYOND FREEDOM AND DIGNITY at 66
(1971).
30. Egoism and individualism are usually viewed as amoral and antithetical to moral-
ity. This viewpoint may be traced to Plato's conception of the individual as a low-level
metaphysical component, something that is inferior to the universal or ideal. See PLATO,
THE REPUBLIC. Another reason for this view is the general tendency to consider Thomas
Hobbes as the advocate of egoistic ethics, even though the Hobbesean conception of
human life clearly leaves no room for morality. See S. R. Letwin, Modern Philosophies of
Law, THE GREAT IDEAS TODAY (1972); Hobbes and Christianity, DAEDALUS (Winter 1976).
Subsequent views of ethics, such as Locke's mitigated hedonism and Bentham's full-
blown version, along with John Stuart Mill's utilitarianism, fail to qualify as bona fide
ethical theories, mainly because they tend to deny freedom of human choice. They have
a theory of value, however, which accounts for their frequent use in economics.
Egoism or individualism has fallen into disrepute as a moral system because of the view
that individuals are either inferior beings or ones only inclined to conduct themselves in
an anti-social way. As an example of this, consider the following remark: "What is most
important is that motives of this sort be distinguished from the typical criminal motive:
self-interest ... " J. MURPHY, CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE AND VIOLENCE (1971). For the numerous
efforts to defeat Hobbesean egoism, see D. Gauthier, The Impossibility of Rational
Egoism, 71 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY 439-56 (1974); K. Nielsen, On the Rationality of
'Rational Egoism,' 55 THE PERSONALIST 398-400 (1974); J. Rachels, Two Arguments
Against Ethical Egoism, PHILOSOPHIA 297-314 (April-July 1974). In all of these discussions
egoism is generally construed as the doctrine where each person does what he desires,
wishes, or wants. Such hedonistic and/or psychological egoism is indeed deficient, as it
provides the acting individual with no standard for determining what is in fact in his or
her own best interest. Conflicting alternatives and desires often face us, and we frequently
require a standard for deciding what course of conduct to pursue. Eudaimonistic individu-
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DIGNITY VERSUS WELFARE
The major objection to the individualistic viewpoint comes
from those who consider economic welfare or spiritual perfection
the primary goal of political life. The widespread acceptance of
either economic or spiritual welfarisms, and the forceful intellec-
tual support behind it, have produced certain trends. Current
political issues have focused on economic welfare and the quality
of life, but only rarely address the issue of the usurpation of
human dignity through the loss of liberty. The case for dignity is
admitted only in the abstract discussions of political theory,
where the dominant idea is that liberty and welfare must be
balanced.31
While individualism was once hailed in the United States, it
is criticized today as being amoral and heartless. But the pro-
posed alternatives are utopian ideals. The individualist viewpoint
is unable to promise honestly that everyone will eventually be
completely well off. Since the utopian promises are unattainable,
however, the individualist ideal of a free society, in which each
person can aspire to human excellence, is clearly superior.
Most intellectuals still want to push society toward utopian
perfection. This is because they develop their political principles
by consulting common moral intuitions, which are based on cer-
tain well-entrenched, personal, non-political, altruistic princi-
ples, such as equality, self-sacrifice, and sharing of one's wealth.
They give support mainly to welfare-oriented public policy, so as
to effectuate these ideals in the political sphere, disregarding that
this would make personal moral choices a matter of coercive pub-
lic policy.
Thus, our culturally prominent ideas of morality often directly
conflict with political implications of the theory of ethical indi-
vidualism or egoism. These ideas support the belief that eco-
alism, or classical egoism, offers such a standard in its reference to human nature. See A.
RAND, THE OBJECTIVIST ETHICS (1961); D. NORTON, PERSONAL DESTINIES: A PHILOSOPHY OF
ETHICAL INDIVIDUALISM (1976); Machan, Selfishness and Capitalism, INQUIRY 338-44 (Fall
1974).
31. See G. Vlastos, Justice and Equality, SOCIAL JUSTICE (R. B. Brandt ed. 1962);
Scheffler, Natural Rights, Equality, and the Minimal State, CANADIAN JOURNAL OF
PHILOSOPHY 59-76 (March 1976); Grey, Property and Need: The Welfare State and Theo-
ries of Distributive Justice, 28 STAN. L. REV. 877 (1976).
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nomic or spiritual equality, not liberty, should be the supreme
political goal.32 The prevailing view is that a good society must
insure equal economic or spiritual welfare. This is accomplished
not only by providing equal opportunity to all citizens, but by
effectuating the equal distribution of material goods and pater-
nalistic care. It logically follows that if the law is to serve justice,
it must sacrifice individual liberty when the exercise of that lib-
erty leads to inequality.
If the proper political goal is the equal progress of all individu-
als, then obviously the proper function of law is to achieve this
goal. Clearly, bringing about full equality among citizens will
require the widespread enforcement of economic and related
changes required to eradicate the natural and inevitable differ-
ences among individuals. The totalitarian and dictatorial conse-
quences are easy to infer. Voluntary cooperation and generosity
are certainly encouraged by those who oppose governmental wel-
farism. Within the welfarist system, however, that is not regarded
as enough. Individuals are not trusted to live peacefully and to
be responsible for reaching their full potential. The entire concern
with equality of welfare, even in the framework of "upgrading the
poor" and "upholding society's moral fiber," is inconsistent with
the ideal that each person must make his or her own way in life.
This trend toward economic and spiritual equalization is so
strong that when institutions do not meet the established norm,
the government forces progress by utilizing its retaliatory powers
for redistributional and paternalistic purposes. This can be seen
in the use of forced busing to meet integration standards.3 The
government can also indirectly force institutions to meet various
standards by conditioning financial assistance on meeting certain
requirements.34 Such requirements treat members of society as
32. See Machan, Equality's Dependence on Liberty, EQUALITY & FREEDOM: INTERNA-
TIONAL AND COMPARATIVE JURISPRUDENCE (G. Dorsey ed. 1977).
33. See, e.g., Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
The Swann decision sanctioned extensive busing, limiting the practice only when the
transporting of pupils would be detrimental to the educational process or the safety of the
students. Id. at 29-31. See also R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977); J. RAWLS,
A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971).
34. For example, the National Endowment for the Arts, created at 20 U.S.C. §951 et
seq. (1971) bases the award of grants on regulations and criteria set by the Chairman of
the Endowment.
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tools for other people's programs. This personal responsibility for
others which underlies well-intentioned programs also underlies
the more radical techniques of behavior modification and psycho-
surgery.
All nonretaliatory governmental coercion, because it treats
people as tools, is antithetical to any respect for human dignity.
While it is true that some people should give to others to assist
them in reaching their goals, forcing those individuals to do so
plainly robs them of their dignity. There is nothing morally
worthwhile in forced giving. Generally, for a society to respect
human dignity, the special moral relations between people should
be left undisturbed. Government should confine itself to making
sure that this voluntarism is not abridged, no matter how tempt-
ing it might be to use its coercive powers to attain some worthy
goal. Obviously, this idea is neither accepted nor widely promul-
gated in our times. Most institutions are oriented in the opposite
direction, where the state acts as the tool to foster a variety of
special goals and produce desired ends for millions of disparate
individuals and groups.
The popular conception of governmental responsibility for eco-
nomic or spiritual welfare is rejected in this present essay. Eco-
nomic, spiritual, or psychological welfare should not be a primary
political goal, although in different situtations such equality may
indeed be valuable and well fostered by competent protection of
human liberty. If welfare and equality are to be primary aims of
law, some people must necessarily possess a greater power of
coercion in order to force redistribution of material goods. Politi-
cal power alone should be equal among human beings; yet, striv-
ing for other kinds of equality absolutely requires political ine-
quality.35 The institution of law itself is utterly subverted when
35. See Machan, A Note on Socialism and Elitism, INTERCOLLEGIATE REVIEW 33-34
(1975). Marx recognized this temporary inequality and allowed for it in his theory as
merely a temporary political condition. Prior to the emergence of ideal communism a
period of dictatorship would be required, one which would take on the form of socialism.
Some analysts, such as Michael Harrington, insist this could be done in a democratic
manner. However, the asserted possibility of democratic socialism can be contested. See
Interview with L. Kolakowski, ENCOUNTER (June 1977). The liberty to make an indepen-
dent political judgment and to engage in political advocacy without the prior security of
one's livelihood is considerably diminished when the state owns all the factories, offices,
schools, and whatever else may constitute a place of employment. Although capitalism
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law is made the tool for the achievement of various special goals
by using it to secure nonvoluntary support for those goals."6 In
plainest terms, coercion is justified only as a defense against ac-
tual or threatened physical violence, which is a violation of basic
human rights. The use of coercion to provide welfare or achieve
equality is not justified.
Current belief that such coercion is justified is supported by the
view that individuals are passive entities driven by circumstances
and possessing no free will. Those believing that welfare or equal-
ity is a primary political goal do not accept the premise that each
person is able to be responsible for governing his or her own con-
duct. 7 They believe that progress is blocked by economic or spir-
itual factors. This was a central element of Marx's concept of
human liberty. They also believe that government must elimi-
nate these outside barriers, even if some people's liberty must be
infringed."
There is no question that the state must protect the freedom
of its citizens. However, if the concept of "freedom" is used to
mean freedom from lack of wealth, ignorance, moral grace, and
hardship, the state becomes not only the peace keeper, but the
welfare provider. Of course, not all aspects of the paternalistic
conception of the state emerge from the view that human beings
involves economic risks, socialism appears to involve the risk of being legally disenfran-
chised and forcibly excluded from participation in community life.
36. Alcibiades said to Pericles, as reported in Xenophone's Memorabilia, i, 2, 40-46,
that law that is not confined to defensive force is not a valid and morally justified law.
Attempts to force equality upon a people result in placing some in the position of requiring
others to yield services. These are not cases of punishment given for initiating force against
people, as it would be where coercion is used to retaliate defensively against murder, theft,
fraud, or extortion.
37. More precisely, those who construe economic, psychological, or related types of
well-being tend to view people as (a) moved by forces they do not control, and (b) fully
emancipated only when they reach some (unspecified) stage of economic, psychological,
or related level of well-being. Karl Marx is the most radical example of those persons
adhering to this view. In less radical and more inconsistent fashion, political thinkers such
as J. Rawls, M. Harrington, and the majority of social scientists making recommendations
for social policy agree with this view. In political philosophy, however, the prominent idea
today is that the requirement for liberty must be balanced with the requirement for
welfare. See Machan, Prima Facie versus Natural (Human) Rights, THE JOURNAL OF VALUE
INQUIRY 119-31 (1976).
38. This position was presented in an untitled paper by Professor Alan Gewirth at
Marquette University, October 16,1974.
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are passive entities." Even when the passive view is partially
rejected, the perception of a basic deficiency in individual capac-
ity to progress is used to justify the perpetuation of paternalistic
elements in the legal system."0
These developments in America's political institutions are dif-
ficult to explain. Perhaps the paternalistic role of government
resulted from the neglect or deliberate debasement of a system
that began with the highest though not fully consistent regard for
the capacities of the individual. Of course, a more complex ex-
planation may be involved.
The American political tradition is correctly regarded as essen-
tially individualistic. But the philosophical background of this
individualism is confused. In American culture, persons were gen-
erally regarded as moral agents with the responsibility to make
their own way in life. Nevertheless, within the same tradition,
people were often seen to be motivated exclusively by the desire
for material gain. This view has been widely promulgated in eco-
nomics, for example. These traditions are contradictory, as the
existence of moral self-responsibility implies that humans can be
motivated by factors other than a desire for material possessions.
The conflict in these views has had an impact on the legal
developments of our culture. As an obvious example, restrictions
on civil liberties are being lifted, but the demise of substantive
economic due process fosters the idea that individuals are incapa-
ble of improving their lives from any point on the economic con-
tinuum.4 Recent judicial decisions and legislation empower the
state's regulation of the voluntary creative and productive activi-
39. For example, some ancient Greek political philosophers envisioned the state as the
spiritual father of a community. There is, however, debate about whether Aristotle be-
lieved that the state or the civil community should fill the leadership role. If the latter,
there is no negation of the dignity of individuals, because the kind of leadership a civil
community could offer need not be compulsory, coercive, or otherwise disrespectful of a
person's choice and self-responsibility. See F. D. Miller, The State and the Community
in Aristotle's Politics, REASON PAPERS (1974).
40. The idea is resurfacing today that government should support the religions of a
community, but not the arts, sciences, education, commerce, sports, or secular inspira-
tional organizations. This seems to be in response to the perception throughout the culture
that there has been a decline in the quality of life. See W. BERNS, THE FIRST AMENDMENT
AND THE FUTURE OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (1976).
41. Several recent commentators have pointed to this paradox in the cultural traditions
and elements of American society. See, e.g., D. BELL, THE CULTURAL CONTRADICTIONS OF
CAPITALISM (1975).
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ties of individuals. Indirect control is slowly beginning to be exer-
cised over certain specially guarded areas of human endeavor,
such as political and artistic activities, by conditioning financial
assistance on various governmentally-ordained requirements.
These controls clearly foster greater governmental paternalism
and authoritarianism throughout. First, help is offered to "clean
up" elections or to "support" the arts; compliance with provisions
aimed at achieving various social goals then determines the help
contingency.
It may be maintained, of course, that governmental assistance
in the form of supervision and endowments provides additional
opportunities for personal progress. Yet the price is morally unac-
ceptable. The aid is provided at other people's expense, so some
will urge restrictions on those groups who will be able to obtain
it. Instead of the admittedly diverse system of private assistance
with diverse private "strings attached," assistance today is
largely centralized and administered politically, requiring full
submission to various federal regulatory provisions.
Some effort has recently been made to allow direct public sup-
port of the arts, but still with government help. For example, the
recently formed arts lobby headed by actor Henry Fonda" will
urge Congress to make possible direct funding for the arts. If
enacted, HR 1042 would enable taxpayers to check off some of
their tax dollars for specified artistic endeavors. Yet, those who
would want to support different activities will have to fend for
themselves and would be put at a disadvantage by such propos-
als. Next, all other preferred endeavors could warrant such state
measures. Regardless of how urgently economic support is desired
or needed by some persons, there is no justification for any person
to use the state for his or her special purposes, even if only by
making it a collection and dispersal agent. That just is not the
government's proper vocation.
Admittedly, not all people have an equal opportunity to accom-
plish their various goals. This is especially true in cases where a
person is saddled with genetic defects or is born into negligent or
42. HR 1042, 94th Congress, 1st Sess. (1977), which provides that persons be allowed
to make financial contributions to the arts and humanities in connection with the pay-
ment of their income taxes. The legislation is sponsored by Rep. Fred Richmond (D-NY).
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unfortunate family situations. But, even under those circum-
stances, persons can conduct their lives for better or for worse. In
any case, the proper function of law is to make it possible for all
individuals to govern their own lives within the broad or narrow
limitations afforded by the particular conditions of their individ-
ual existence. Anything should be pursued freely, voluntarily, lest
it involve coercive interference with an individual's life and place
some people in the position of managers of others' personal and
social affairs. This point can be made more directly by discussing
the situation of the economically poor. Certain goals in life are
unreachable for such people. For example, they are less able to
obtain proper education than others coming from more favorable
economic circumstances. This is often considered as a reason to
justify coercive redistribution of wealth.
The present approach rejects this redistributionist view. Being
rich or poor, for a start, is not central to human achievement. A
poor plumber can have a far more successful life than a rich movie
star. While the news media and our culture in general do not
promulgate this point, our personal relationships and private
experiences often demonstrate the view's validity. More impor-
tantly, welfare legislation and governmental regulation do not
provide people with, and indeed obstruct, what is crucial for lead-
ing a successful human life, namely, doing one's very best in his
or her own particular circumstances. The law should enhance this
only by protecting each individual from those who would interfere
with his effort or lack of effort to achieve his individual potential.
Many individuals allege that minimal economic survival re-
quirements, surely crucial for a dignified human life, could not
be met by some people if the state did not intercede and provide
assistance. This charge ignores economic history. The United
States Government has exercised relatively less state control over
the lives of individuals than any other government in recent world
history. This has helped to produce a better general economic life
than that which other societies have, particularly those with ex-
tensive government welfare programs and regulation.
What is most important in terms of human dignity is that a
system of governmental paternalism, welfarism, and protection-
ism necessarily regards the essential dignity of individuals as
being of less than primary significance. In contrast, a society with
freedom as the primary goal, while it-as others, despite their
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claims-cannot guarantee against poverty, has repeatedly proven
to be more productive. This is because free citizens are generally
willing to be more productive than slaves or semi-slaves. When
relationships between individuals in society are non-coercive,
except in retaliation to initiated force, the prospect for all mem-
bers developing their own innate individual economic, educa-
tional, professional, and other potential is enhanced.
Freedom as the legal respect for individual dignity can only
provide the necessary optimum social conditions for the flourish-
ing of individuals. It is the individuals themselves who are ulti-
mately responsible for their success under such circumstances.
THE RIGHT TO PROPERTY AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM
If law should serve to establish a framework within which in-
dividuals can develop successfully, the citizenry, government's
various branches, and the legal profession must determine what
conditions provide individuals the optimum freedom of action.
One way to establish a workable framework is to reaffirm our
political and legal commitment to the right to property. Uphold-
ing property rights facilitates and encourages individual liberty.
Liberty cannot be realized in a vacuum. People are conscious
as well as physical entities whose liberty must involve action in
the material world. For example, writers need pencil and paper
to exercise their freedom of expression. Unless individuals are free
to produce, obtain, keep, and trade their tools, they cannot be
free of others' interference. If the government has legal title to the
tools needed by a writer, architect, teacher, or plumber to accom-
plish his or her chosen goals, such a person is dependent on and
must seek permission to act from the government. For example,
in the Soviet Union, where the government controls the printing
presses and publishing organizations, anyone wishing to state an
opinion must gain official sanction to express his or her views. In
countries where broadcasting is government business, there is no
widespread competition of views on the airways. In contrast,
where the right to property is respected, individuals do not have
to seek political permission to act, even if they still must earn the
opportunity to do so via the free marketplace.
The right to property is the right to work for, acquire, and hold
goods and valuables; it includes the rights of production, trade,
[Vol. 26:807
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and bequeathal. This is not a right to be provided with goods, but
rather an injunction which prohibits others from impeding a per-
son's voluntary attempt to obtain what he wants. 3 The right to
pursue individual excellence in life requires full support of the
right to property-even aesthetic achievements, for example, re-
quire materials."
Unfortunately, property rights are neither favored nor legally
protected in our era, as many people associate these rights with
a misunderstood economic history.45 Both cultural and legal de-
velopments in the last 100 years have undermined the protection
of property rights. 6 Yet, contrary to widespread contentions, the
institution of private property does not generate the development
of cartels and oligopolies that stifle economic prosperity and yield
unfair political advantage. 7 First, an era of laissez-faire never
fully existed; and second, there is ample evidence to show that
the so-called abuses of the free market were in fact mainly the
result of governmental interference. This interference took the
43. For a clear discussion of this concept, see Ayn Rand, Man's Rights in CAPITALISM:
THE UNKNOWN IDEAL (1967). The essential point is that freedom of action involves the
freedom to act vis-a-vis the world, including the freedom to attempt to gain, keep, and
trade various items. However, the right to property is not the right to be given things, but
the right to engage in the actions that can lead to having things. One inherently possesses
this right because it is proper for each person to attempt to achieve happiness in life, and
to pursue the material goods which will enhance this happiness. As Rand explains: "The
right to property means that a man has the right to take the economic actions necessary
to earn property, to use it and to dispose of it; it does not mean that others must provide
him with property." Id.
44. Id. See also Sadowsky, Private Property and Collective Ownership in THE LIBER-
TARIAN ALTERNATIVE (T. Machan ed. 1974).
45. Many people believe that the rise of capitalism and the reduction of state control
over economic life produced poverty, alienation and deprivation for millions. At the same
time, a class of ruthless capitalists emerged and wielded enormous power over their com-
munities. The stories of child labor, sweat shops, and robber barons are widely believed.
For a different view, see CAPITALISM AND THE HISTORIANS (F. A. Hayek ed. 1954); M. BYER,
HEALTH, WELFARE AND POPULATION IN THE EARLY DAYS OF THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION
(1926); W. NEFF, VICTORIAN WORKING WOMEN (1920); G. M. TREVELYAN, ENGLISH SOCIAL
HISTORY (1942); J. CHAMBERLAIN, THE ENTERPRISING AMERICANS (1961).
46. R. McCloskey, Economic Due Process and the Supreme Court in THE SUPREME
COURT AND THE CONSTITUTION (P. Kurland ed. 1965); Letwin, Economic Due Process in
the American Constitution and the Rule of Law in ESSAYS ON F. A. HAYEK (R.L. Cun-
ningham ed. 1977).
47. See M. ROTHBARD, MAN, ECONOMY AND STATE (1962); Brozen, Is the Government the
Source of Monopoly? in THE LIBERTARIAN ALTERNATIVE (T. Machan ed. 1974), for theoreti-
cal and historical demonstrations of this point.
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form of granting of special privileges, the granting of monopoly
status by various state bodies, and the disproportionate wealth
distribution by means of state support of national or public inter-
est projects." Still, the persistent distrust of a free society and
free market, with a strict disrespect for property rights, has en-
gendered widespread intrusions into people's economic rela-
tions. 9
The state often acts in a paternalistic fashion toward the citi-
zen's right to own and manage property. For example, the state
is increasingly willing to freely usurp mutually agreed-upon con-
tracts. Under the theory of unconscionability, 0 the state can re-
48. R. CHILDS, JR., Big Business and the Rise of American Statism and Armentano,
Capitalism and the Antitrust Laws, in THE LIBERTARIAN ALTERNATIVE (T. Machan ed.
1974).
49. A recent instance of such influence is the concept of unconscionability in contract
law. For example, in Tunkl v. Regents of University of California, 60 Cal.2d 92 (1963),
the court held that not only does "the hospital-patient contract clearly fall within the
category of agreements affecting the public interest," thus justifying the violation of the
rights of contracting parties to specify the terms of their interaction, but "in insisting that
the patient accept the provision of waiver in the contract, the hospital certainly exercises
a decisive advantage in bargaining." The court held that the problem is that "[tihe
would-be patient is in no position to reject the proffered agreement, to bargain with the
hospital, or in lieu of agreement to find another hospital."
We should admit, however, that most of the problems that fall under both procedural
and substantive unconscionability decisions cannot be treated solely by an economic
analysis. See Kornhauser, Unconscionability in Standard Forms, 64 CAL. L. REv. 1151
(1976), for a sharp critique of such efforts. Economics should not be decisive. The current
remedies, however, assume that judicial and legislative intervention can produce more
just and equitable results than decentralization. In terms of the present non-paternalist
analysis, instances of allegedly unconscionable contracts which occur even in open but
poor consumer markets do not, in the absence of fraud or duress, justify governmental
interference if the conditions of poverty were produced peacefully. See D. CAPLOVITZ, THE
POOR PAY MORE (1963). The contrary view assumes that people cannot improve their
economic conditions and are owed charity by means of invalidating their contractual
responsibilities.
50. When the law finds a contract is so unreasonable to the interest of a contracting
party as to render it unenforceable, such a contract is termed unconscionable. Section 2-
302 of the Uniform Commercial Code, which adopts the doctrine of unconscionability, has
been codified in all but three of our states (California and North Carolina omit section
2-302, and Louisiana has not enacted the Uniform Commercial Code). Section 2-302 reads:
(1) If the court as a matter of law finds the contract to have been unconsciona-
ble at the time it was made, the court may refuse to enforce the contract, or it
may enforce the remainder of the contract without the unconscionable clause,
or it may so limit the application of any unconscionable clause as to avoid any
unconscionable result.
(2) When it is claimed or appears to the court that the contract or any clause
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fuse to respect contractual agreements when so-called unequal
economic parties are involved. For example, the customers of a
department store and the corporation that owns it are regarded
as unequal bargaining parties. These state policies clearly under-
mine a crucial function of a good legal system: respect for the
individual's capacity to make proper choices.
It is sometimes argued that the unconscionability rules are
directed against those adhesion contracts which do not allow
"meaningful" free choice. However, if men and women form a
corporation and invest in it their earnings, work, and time, others
do not have a right to force such voluntary associations, i.e., the
corporation, to write contracts for the convenience of customers
who cannot meet the standard form requirements. Of course, if
thereof may be unconscionable the parties shall be afforded a reasonable oppor-
tunity to present evidence as to its commercial setting, purpose and effect to
aid the court in making the determination.
The term "unconscionability" was defined in Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co.,
350 F.2d 445, 449-50 (D.C. Cir. 1965):
Unconscionability has generally been recognized to include an absence of mean-
ingful choice on the part of one of the parties together with contract terms which
are unreasonably favorable to the other party . . . . Ordinarily, one who signs
an agreement without full knowledge of its terms might be held to assume the
risk that he has entered into a one-sided bargain. But when a party of little bar-
gaining power, and hence little real choice, signs a commercially unreasonable
contract with little or no knowledge of its terms, it is hardly likely that his
consent . . .was ever given to all the terms. In such a case the usual rule that
the terms of an agreement are not to be questioned should be abandoned and
the court should consider whether the terms of the contract are so unfair that
enforcement should be withheld.
Excessive price can render a contract unconscionable. See, e.g., American Home Improve-
ment, Inc. v. Maclver, 105 N.H. 435, 201 A.2d 886 (1964) (goods sold and services rendered
were worth $959, but the additional charges of $800 for commission and $809 for finance
charges resulted in an excessive price); Frostifresh Corp. v. Reynoso, 52 Misc. 2d 26, 274
N.Y.S. 2d 757 (Dist. Ct. 1966), rev'd on issue of relief, 54 Misc. 2d 119, 281 N.Y.S. 2d 964
(1967) (Spanish-speaking consumer purchased freezer for $1,145.88 when the wholesale
cost to the seller had been $348). A creditor-seller's contractual meddling with his own
and his buyer's rights and remedies upon default can bring about an unconscionable
contract. See, e.g., Denkin v. Sterner, 10 Pa. D.&C.2d 203 (C.P. 1956) (striking down a
liquidated damage clause on the ground that it was unconscionable); Jefferson Credit
Corp. v. Marcano, 60 Misc.2d 138, 302 N.Y.S.2d 390 (Sup. Ct. 1969) (disclaimer ineffec-
tive because of the lack of equality between the bargaining parties). On the general issue
of unconscionability, see Ellinghaus, In Defense of Unconscionability, 78 YALE L. J. 757
(1969); Leff, Unconscionability and the Crowd-Consumers and the Common Law
Tradition, 31 U. PnT. L. REV. 349 (1970); Speidel, Unconscionability, Assent and Con-
sumer Protection, 31 U. PITT. L. REV. 359 (1970).
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the standard form contracts hinder the business, the people who
use them will not succeed in their business venture. But the indi-
viduals standing behind the mistakenly regarded "faceless" cor-
poration should not be forced to succumb to the demands of those
who want what the corporation has to offer. Refusing to recognize
the liberty of corporations-i.e., voluntarily formed economic as-
sociations-is no less an affront to human dignity than refusing
to recognize the liberty of an individual shareholder. This situa-
tion can be contrasted with certain elements of legislation such
as Truth in Lending,5 which, by requiring accurate information,
facilitates choice by protecting against fraud. Similarly, paternal-
istic legislation and regulation of commerce and industry are
often combined with legitimate provisions that protect a person
against fraud, extortion, or misrepresentation. What is unjustifia-
ble is that courts are attempting to remedy the failure of individ-
uals doing business or entering contracts to adequately prepare
for their lives. Thus it would be possible to plan for future hospi-
talization and avoid being made the "victim" of unconscionable
hospital rules. The same is possible in one's dealings with corpo-
rations and their standard forms. The fact that many individuals
refuse to prepare for dealing competently in a complex society is
no justification for forcing those who have done so to forego their
resulting benefits.
Early in our history, American legal institutions put serious
limitations on the right to property, including freedom of con-
tract. In 1876, during a time when laissez-faire was at its peak,
the Supreme Court in Munn v. Illinois,52 ruled that business
"affected with a public interest""3 could not be free of government
interference. Ten years later, the Supreme Court transferred the
regulation of commerce from state to federal jurisdiction on
grounds that "the right of continuous transportation from one
end of the country to the other is essential in modern times." 4
Subsequently, in this century, we have witnessed the total demise
of substantive economic due process and the expansion of the
51. 15 U.S.C.A. §§1601-66 (1974 and Supp. 11 1976).
52. 69 Il. 80 (1873), aff'd 94 U.S. 113 (1876).
53. 69 Il. at 134.
54. Wabash, St. Louis & Pacific Railway Co. v. Illinois, 105 Ill. 234 (1883), rev'd, 118
U.S. 557, 572-73 (1886).
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federal and state governments' power to regulate property and
business.55 By now, through judicial interpretation, the Com-
merce Clause of the federal Constitution sanctions the most ex-
tensive and pervasive violations of private property rights. Such
judicial interpretations and the rejection of economic due process
have rendered the Fifth and Fourth Amendments feeble legal
measures against government power to violate private property
rights and to regulate commercial endeavors. 8
HUMAN DIGNITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS
Some may still argue that these developments do not debase
human dignity because they evolved through the democratic pro-
cess. But, use of the democratic process does not justify restric-
tions on individual rights. Certain decisions may be popular but
not morally permissible.57 The fact that a citizenry does not pro-
test vigorously cannot license government encroachment upon a
person's liberty. Similarly, despite the fact that a welfare state
can benefit some people economically via the usurpation of
human rights and dignity, that benefit does not justify limiting
individual liberty. Democracy cannot be unlimited in its scope of
concern. As an example, in West Virginia Board of Education v.
Barnette,5" the United States Supreme Court stated:
55. See, e.g., Day Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421 (1952) wherein the
majority of the court stated that a state legislature can control business and labor prac-
tices within extremely broad limits. The Court found that issues relating to business,
economic, and social affairs should be left to legislative decision free of court interference.
Id. at 424-5.
56. See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955), wherein the Supreme
Court observed that "[t]he day is gone when this court uses the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment to strike down state laws, regulatory of business and in-
dustrial conditions, because they may be unwise, improvident or out of harmony with a
particular school of thought .... " Id. at 488. Accord, North Dakota Board of Pharmacy
v. Snyder's Drug Stores, 414 U.S. 156, 164-67 (1973); Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726,
730, 733 (1963).
57. Whether moral judgments can be proven true or false is a controversial issue. For
the views of commentators who feel that moral judgments cannot be proven true or false,
see note 14 supra. See also Attfield, The Logical Status of Moral Utterances, THE JOURNAL
OF CRITICAL ANALYSIS 70-84 (1972); Alan Gewirth, The 'Is-Ought'Problem Resolved, Presi-
dential Address, 72nd Annual Western Meeting of the American Philosophical Association
(1974).
58. 319 U.S. 624 (1942).
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The very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain
subjects from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place
them beyond the reach of majorities . . . . One's . . . funda-
mental rights may not be submitted to vote; they depend on the
outcome of no elections. 9
Any democracy requires constant constraints, lest the democratic
process be open to elimination via the democratic method.
The theory that law must uphold human dignity is logically
tied to the conception of political justice that rests upon natural
rights. Natural rights theory, especially the recently advanced
version, 0 so formulates principles of law that regard each person
as a moral agent whose life, liberty, and property may not be
controlled by others. Government control, even of a democratic
sort, is justified only if it protects and preserves the rights to life,
liberty, and property. Although people sometimes try to vote
them away, as if they were granted and revocable by society,
government, or the state, these rights are inalienable, even when
positive law disregards them. Thus, although slavery was sanc-
tioned by positive law, it was immoral because persons are by
nature free agents not slaves."'
Now, despite contrary institutional and historical develop-
ments, the proper perspective by which to view the bulk of cur-
rent positive law is a moral theory tied to the nature of man."
This drastic suggestion may be met with the rejoinder that the
entire thesis of this article is in error because dignity either does
not exist or is not of primary importance. The first point has
already been answered. To the second we need to admit that
competing moral ideals will yield competing political and legal
ideals and a corresponding recasting of the function of law in
society. Thus, if stability is the highest political purpose, there
would exist justification for taking measures such as behavior
modification, which disregards the dignity of individuals but
aims to ensure stability.63 If advancing toward communism is
59. Id. at 638.
60. See T. MACHAN, HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMAN LIBERTIES at 204-06.
61. Id. at 116.
62. See Machan, Law, Justice and Natural Rights, 1975 W. ONTARIO L. REV. 119-30.
63. Advocates of behavior modification will not explicitly admit this. Instead, like
Skinner himself, they employ an entirely different language so that value-laden concepts
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crucial, then the terrorism employed and the so called wars of
liberation around the world are of greater significance than efforts
aimed at protecting the moral autonomy and dignity of the indi-
vidual. But, if our society is to give priority to human dignity,
legal institutions should support the individualist tradition,
which views each person as being individually responsible for
leading a successful human life.
CONCLUSION
Dignity is being crushed by the implementation of behavior
modification techniques in the penal and educational systems of
the country. 4 Wherever paternalism sets in, the capacity of indi-
such as dignity no longer find a place in the discussion. Consider. the following statement:
"Successful application of these [behavior modification] techniques becomes more prob-
able when the behavior modifier has firm control over the environmental contingencies;
thus, mental hospitals, prisons, and schools have served as frequent arenas for their
-implementation." The phrase "firm control over the environmental contingencies" ap-
pears to be a value-free technical phrase, referring perhaps to the physical environment,
i.e. the furniture, walls, or structure of a building that surrounds someone whose behavior
is being modified. However, these factors appear to be of little significance when the aim
of the procedure is to eliminate maladaptive behaviors.
However, environmental contingencies include "items" in the social environment.
Moreover, maladaptive behavior modification techniques require a coercing of people to
change their preferred peaceful conduct. Yet, explicit reference to what will constitute
good or bad conduct needs to be excluded in order to placate moralists and to provide
maximum efficiency. Whitman notes that "behavior modifiers in mental hospitals, pris-
ons, and schools hold maximum power over those whose behavior is thought to require
modification. Such ideas as consent, agreement, voluntary cooperation, choice, and evalu-
ation of reasons for administering the techniques, have no place in the vocabulary of be-
haviorism." Whitman, Behavior Modification: Introduction and Implications, 24 DEPAUL
L. REV. 949, 953 (1975). See also BEYOND FREEDOM AND DIGNITY, supra note 3, at 7,
where Skinner criticizes the fact that "[Ailmost everyone who is concerned with human
affairs-as political scientists, philosophers, men of letters, economists, psychologists,
linguists, sociologists, theologians, anthropologists, educators, or psychotherapists-
continues to talk about human behavior in this way (i.e., "in terms of traits of character,
capacities, and abilities")." Skinner's list of such terms include pride, sense of responsi-
bility, will to power, self-respect, initiative, frustration, hopelessness, sense of purpose,
crisis of belief. Id. -
64. See Trotter, Patuxent: "Therapeutic" Prison Faces Toast, A.P.A. MONITOR 6 (May,
1975), where psychologist Arthur Mandel testified that segregation cells (referred to by
inmates as "the hole") were really "negative reinforcers . . . used as positive treatment
conditions." Skinner recounted at a public lecture at U.C. Santa Barbara in early 1971
that he used behavioral modification techniques in his own classrooms, when he wanted
to condition his students not to prepare to leave class prior to the time class ended. For
more systematic designs of behavior modification techniques used for education, see
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viduals to be a decisive element in their own lives diminishes. The
impact of yielding to vested interest-group pressures has also pro-
duced the denigration of individual human dignity and the rapid
spread of state paternalism, the consequences of which are ex-
tremely regrettable and should immediately be rejected and re-
sisted.
There has been an attempt here to outline and defend a moral
case for the existence and value of human dignity and its proper
relationship to various features of a legal system. I have proposed
that human dignity should be upheld within a good legal system
as an essential function of law. Such a function will be fulfilled
if the legal system rests on a theory of natural human rights to
life, liberty, and property. These rights specify the standards by
which each individual's liberty of moral choice can be protected
and preserved, thereby achieving valid, nonutopian social justice.
Although the topic of dignity has usually been considered in light
of the need to protect civil and political rights, an approach
stressing property rights is also needed. When the government
has unlimited legal authority to use, dispose of, and expropriate
property, the individuals who produce and must depend on prop-
erty cannot oppose that government's policies and cannot govern
their own lives.
I have not tried to make the case for my thesis with the tools
of legal research. Such an approach is inadequate for making
basic normative points. Instead, through moral argumentation,"5
one can influence the basic direction of the political and legal
community, a task of every citizen.
The technical tools of legal research are powerless without a
prior determination of the proper direction in which we should
steer our various institutions. The goal should be a consistent and
competent affirmation of human dignity-that is, the full respect
for each member of society as a free and self-responsible being.
Keller, Engineered Personalized Instruction in the Classroom, REVISTA INTERAMERICANA DE
PSICOLOGIA 189-97 (1967).
65. This point is of interest to our discussion of dignity, because underlying the idea of
human dignity is the notion that people can choose to confront issues, follow arguments,
and learn by thinking through the points they may encounter. The assumption here is that
ideas have consequences, whereas the assumption in Skinnerism and the bulk of less
extreme social science is that ideas are mere products of the environment's action upon
the human brain.
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